The Queensland Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Dennison v Brisbane City Council QCA 193 on 29 September 2026. The judgment was delivered by Doyle JA, with Boddice JA and Cooper J concurring.
Why the Case was on appeal
In the first instance, the Supreme Court of Queensland found the Council was negligent. However, it ruled against Mr Dennison on the basis that the Council’s actions did not meet the higher standard of liability imposed by the “unreasonableness standard” in section 36(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) (CLA). Section 36 provides:
“36 Proceedings against public or other authorities based on breach of statutory duty
(1) This section applies to a proceeding that is based on an alleged wrongful exercise of or failure to exercise a function of a public or other authority.
(2) For the purposes of the proceeding, an act or omission of the authority does not constitute a wrongful exercise or failure unless the act or omission was in the circumstances so unreasonable that no public or other authority having the functions of the authority in question could properly consider the act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of its functions.”
Key issues
The case involved a negligence claim brought by Victor George Dennison against Brisbane City Council. On 18 December 2009, Mr Dennison was cycling pre-dawn and collided with a barricade erected by the Council on a shared pedestrian and cyclist path and suffered a horrific impalement injury through his eye socket. The barricade lacked reflective warning signs, lighting, and delineation of an alternative route, contrary to relevant standards and procedures.
The primary legal issues were:
- Whether section 36 of the CLA applied to the appellant’s negligence claim.
- Whether the installation of the barricade constituted the performance of a Council function under section 901 of the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld) (LGA).
- Whether the Council’s actions were so unreasonable that no public authority could properly consider them a reasonable exercise of its functions under section 36(2) of the CLA.
Application of section 36 of the CLA
The primary issue was whether section 36, which modifies the standard of care for public authorities, applied to Mr Dennison’s negligence claim. Mr Dennison argued that section 36 applied only to claims for breach of statutory duty, while the Council contended it also applied to common law negligence claims. The primary judge favoured the broader interpretation. The Court of Appeal upheld that interpretation, finding that section 36 was not confined to statutory duty claims.
Characterisation of the council's function
The second issue was whether the erection of the barricade was part of the Council’s statutory function under section 901 of the LGA. Mr Dennison argued that the barricade was incidental to the Council’s function, while the Council maintained it was integral to the maintenance of the footpath. The Court of Appeal agreed with the primary judge that the barricade was part of the Council’s statutory function, as it was necessary to protect the freshly laid concrete and ensure public safety.
Standard of no reasonable authority
The third issue was whether the Council’s actions fell to the standard prescribed by section 36(2) of the CLA, which requires that an act or omission be so unreasonable that no public authority could consider it a reasonable exercise of its functions. The primary judge found that the Council’s actions, while negligent, were not unreasonably so. However, the Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the Council’s failure to provide adequate warning signs, lighting, and delineation was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have considered it proper. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the Council’s own internal guidelines and industry standards required such safety measures, and there was no evidence that these precautions were impractical or unfeasible.
Orders
The Court of Appeal allowed the Appeal and awarded judgment to Mr Dennison for $675,926.77, plus interest and costs.
Discussion
This case considered the effect of s36 of the CLA, which imposes a higher than usual standard to prove a breach of duty against an authority (the Brisbane City Council) exercising its functions. Based on the facts of this case, the Council was found to have breached its duty despite the higher standard of proof.
